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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the effects of economic crises on the subsequent economic 
performance, economic liberalization and institutional change. Our analysis is based on a 
sample of post-communist countries, most of which experienced severe economic crises in the 
early 1990s. We find that the severity of the crisis has a positive impact on the subsequent 
pace of economic reform and economic growth. The effect on institution change is more 
complicated: the crisis appears to cause an initial worsening of institutions followed by a 
subsequent improvement later on.  
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1 Introduction 
Why do countries undertake systemic reforms of their economies? An important motivation is 
the desire and need to improve the country‟s economic performance and wellbeing of its 
citizens. However, the eventual long-term outcome of economic reforms is uncertain and they 
are usually associated with substantial costs and economic hardship in the short run (Roland, 
2000, chapters 2 and 3). As a result, efficiency-enhancing reforms may be rejected by voters 
even if they are expected to benefit the majority of them (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; 
Rodrik, 1999) or they may be postponed inefficiently long (Alesina and Drazen, 1991).  
Alesina and Drazen (1991) make an intriguing proposition: reforms are postponed because 
of a war of attrition over who will bear their costs. The economic situation then worsens 
progressively until, for one of the parties concerned, the cost of postponing the reform any 
further exceeds the cost of implementing them. They observe, for example, that it is typically 
easier to drum up wide-spread political support for a stabilization program when inflation 
reaches hyperinflationary proportions but not during the preceding (often long) period of 
moderately high inflation. In other words, reform only gets implemented when the underlying 
situation reaches crisis proportions and becomes unsustainable: things have to get really bad 
before they can start getting better.  
This view received some empirical support. Bruno and Easterly (1996, 1998) find that 
growth accelerates following high-inflation crises and that such countries also tend to not only 
stabilize inflation but also liberalize and open up their economies and privatize public assets. 
Drazen and Easterly (2001), similarly, find that experiencing extreme values of inflation and 
black-market premium translates into a more dramatic improvement in subsequent 
performance than moderate ones. However, these papers focus on high-inflation (and debt) 
crises, not on economic contractions. Drazen and Easterly consider growth crises too but fail 
to find any evidence that they similarly foster subsequent improvements.  
Crises also can hinder reform. The studies of determinants of voting behavior in post-
communist countries find that the costly reforms undermine support for pro-reform parties 
and may lead to such parties being voted out of office (Fidrmuc, 2000 a,b; Jackson, Klich and 
Pznańska, 2001; Tucker, 2002). Such political reversals, in turn, allow the winners of partial 
reform to capture the state and stall the reform momentum (Hellman, 1998). This second view 
would suggest that there may be a thin line between vicious and virtuous crises: some crises 
may not generate political consensus in favor of reform but instead lead to the reform being 
abandoned altogether.  
One problem with studying the effect of crises on reform is that episodes of crises and 
those of fundamental reform are relatively rare. Therefore, rather than address this issue in a 
sample of countries with few observations of crises or reform, we focus on a sample of 
countries that are rich both in reform and crises: the post-communist countries. These 
countries were characterized by a high degree of government interference in their economies, 
high to exclusive public ownership of productive assets and high to complete central control 
over prices. All experienced deteriorating economic performance in the course of the 1980s 
which eventually lead to attempts at systemic change in the early 1990s. The reforms 
undertaken (or at least attempted) involved substantial transformation of the underlying 
economic system, transfer of ownership and reallocation of resources. This was expected to 
lead to a more efficient allocation and, in turn, an acceleration of economic growth and, in the 
long term, improvement in economic wellbeing. In the short term, however, the reallocation 
process caused an economic contraction, which, it was hoped, would be followed by a 
recovery and overall improvement over the pre-reform status quo.  
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In reality, however, the depth and length of the „temporary‟ output contraction differed 
considerably. While some countries, such as Poland, Czech Republic or Uzbekistan 
experienced relatively mild recessions and started recovering after 2-5 years, others saw their 
output falling by as much as two-thirds (Moldova, Tajikistan) or even three quarters (Georgia) 
of the pre-transition level, with the recession lasting in some cases for as long as a decade. We 
ask the question whether these initial crises, and their severity, have had any effect on the 
subsequent reform momentum, economic performance or institutional change. After briefly 
introducing the data in the following section, section 3 presents the results of our analysis of 
the impact of crises on economic liberalization, growth, investments, inflation and 
institutional change.  
 
2 Data 
The analysis covers all post-communist countries for which data are available. Altogether, we 
thus use data on 29 countries that used to be part of the former Soviet zone of influence, 
including the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia.1 The crises and reforms we consider started in the early 1990s, shortly after 
the collapse of communist regimes in these countries. Our data therefore cover the years 1990 
to 2008. The latter year is the latest year for which data were available at the time our study 
was initiated. Conveniently, it also largely eliminates the current on-going economic crises 
from the analysis so that it does not compound the effects of the transition-induced crises that 
we are after.  
To capture the countries‟ progress in implementing market-oriented reforms, we use the 
average of the eight progress-in-transition indicator compiled and published annually by the 
EBRD.2 We exploit the World Bank Development Indicators 2009 as the source of all 
macroeconomic variables, except for unemployment rates which we obtained from the EBRD 
Transition Reports (various issues). We use the average Freedom House democracy index3 
and Kaufmann and al.‟s (2009) governance indicators to take account of the progress in 
political and institutional transitions. Finally, we take account of periods of war using the 
Correlates of War (2010) dataset.   
 
3 Results  
As the first step in our analysis, we need a variable to measure the severity of transition-
induced recession. To do this, we compute the cumulative output fall (in percent) since 1989. 
We only consider the contraction of output and not the subsequent recovery (which we seek to 
                                                 
1 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Monte Negro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
2 These indicators measure each country’s progress in the following fields: price liberalization, foreign exchange 
and trade liberalization, small scale privatization, large scale privatization, enterprise reform, competition policy, 
banking reform and non-banking financial institutions. Each indicators ranges from 1 (unreformed centrally-
planned economy) to 4+ (liberal market economy). As is common in this  literature, we replace plus and minus 
distinctions  by adding and subtracting 0.33 (so that 4+ becomes 4.33 while 4- is 3.67). We do not use the more 
recently available EBRD indicators of infrastructure reform, only the eight original indicators measuring 
progress in Washington-consensus reform (liberalization, stabilization and privatization).  
3 Specifically, this index is the average of the Freedom House measures of political freedoms and civil liberties, 
rescaled so that higher values correspond to more democracy. It ranges between 1 (autocracy) to 7 (fully free).  
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explain). That means that once output reaches the bottom of its post-1989 trajectory, we keep 
output fall at the level attained at the lowest point. In this way, it captures the maximum size 
of the cumulative output contraction over the previous years since the beginning of 
transition.4 Our objective is to see whether the severity of the output fall has had a lasting 
impact on the subsequent pace of market-oriented reform, economic performance and other 
outcomes of interest. Moreover, as the effect of the crisis can vanish as time goes by, we also 
compute a “time after crisis” variable which takes the value 0 during the crisis, and becomes a 
time trend thereafter. We interact this time variable with output fall to test whether the effect 
of the crisis diminishes or strengthens over time.  
We first consider the impact of output fall on progress in implementing market oriented 
reform. Our dependent variable is the first difference in the average of the eight progress-in-
transition indicators of the EBRD. Each regression includes the lagged level of this index to 
account for the past level of reform: holding everything else constant, a country can 
implement more reform if its starting level of reform is low. We also include the lagged level 
of the average Freedom House democracy index to account for the possible reform-fostering 
effect of democratization (Fidrmuc, 2003) and a dummy distinguishing countries experiencing 
a military conflict. Except for the war dummy, all independent variables are included in lags 
in order to avoid any endogeneity problems. All regressions are fixed-effects panel 
regressions.  
The results are presented in Table 1. Column (1) presents the most parsimonious 
specification. We find that the lagged level of reform slows down the implementation of 
further reform; this is not surprising given that the reform index is bound from above. The 
level of past democracy, on the other hand, fosters economic liberalization. Not surprisingly, 
countries affected by war reform their economies more slowly. The variable of interest, output 
fall, is positive and highly significant: countries that experienced a deeper contraction, ceteris 
paribus, respond to this by accelerating economic reform.  
It is possible, however, that this effect is found only because output fall is correlated with 
some other influential variable. In column (2), we replace it with lagged per-capita GDP (in 
thousands of PPP US dollars) to capture the effect of the level of economic development on 
progress in reform. Its effect is negative and significant – richer countries implement less 
reform – which seems similar to the positive effect of output fall in column (1). However, 
when we include both variables together in column (3), only output fall remains significant 
while GDP per capita now appears to have no effect on reform progress. In column (4), we 
add lagged inflation (in logs to reduce the influence of episodes of extremely high inflation). 
Its effect is positive and significant: a recent experience of high inflation helps accelerate 
reforms. Yet, the effect of output fall remains strongly significant and essentially unchanged. 
Adding unemployment (column 5) similarly makes little difference (although it makes the 
effect of inflation insignificant and unemployment itself seems to discourage reform). Finally, 
the last column introduces a measure of the time that elapsed since the end of crisis, along 
with squared time, and these two terms interacted with output fall.5 The quadratic time trend 
can potentially capture the time specific profile of reform while the interaction term between 
time and output fall will show whether the effect of the crises on subsequent reform 
strengthens or diminishes over time. None of these variables are significant, however. This 
                                                 
4 In several cases, a country in question experienced a double-dip recession. One example is Russia where output 
initially started to recover in 1997 only to fall further in 1998 following its economic and financial crisis. In that 
case, we consider the deeper dip out of the two as the bottom of the transformational recession (the second dip in 
1998 in Russian case).  
5 We also test for non linear effect of output fall itself introducing it on a quadratic form, but it wasn’t 
significant. This result is available upon request.  
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means that the effect of crisis appears immediately and appears permanent.  
Next, we consider the impact of transition-induced output fall on the subsequent growth. 
Specifically, the dependent variable now is the growth rate of per-capita GDP. Each 
regression controls for lagged growth, lagged reform index as well as for being involved in a 
military conflict. The results are summarized in Table 2. Lagged growth appears with a 
positive coefficient which, nevertheless, is well below one: there is path-dependence in 
growth but it is limited. Countries that progressed further in terms of market-oriented reform 
appear to grow faster but this effect is not always significant. Importantly, the effect of output 
fall is always strongly significant and positive: the crises are followed by accelerated growth. 
The positive effect of output fall is akin to the standard economic-convergence pattern: 
countries experiencing transition-induced recession become poorer and then, not surprisingly, 
they catch up faster. Indeed, when we include GDP per capita in our regressions, it appears, as 
is standard in the growth literature, with a negative and significant coefficient (column 2). 
However, when controlling for per-capita GDP alongside output fall (column 3), the 
coefficient of output fall changes only little while that of lagged output per person loses its 
significance: the effect of crisis dominates the convergence effect. Inflation translates into 
lower growth but again the positive effect of output fall persists, as is the case when adding 
unemployment (columns 4 and 5). In column (6), we again introduce the time since end of 
crisis and the interaction term between time and output fall. The quadratic time trend is not 
significant but the interaction terms are. Specifically, we observe an inverted U-shaped 
pattern: the positive effect of the crisis initially strengthens but eventually falls again.6  
In Tables 3 and 4, we consider the effect of output fall on investment and inflation. It is 
conceivable that a crisis can have indirect effects on growth via its impact on the evolution of 
some of the determinants of growth. However, neither investment nor inflation seems to be 
affected by the severity of the transition-induced recession. It is worth noting, nevertheless, 
that the progress in reform is as a strong determinant of investment. Since we find that crises 
foster reform progress, they would also tend to encourage investment indirectly. Furthermore, 
the crisis effect on both investment and inflation appears to change over time, following an 
inverted U-shaped pattern for investment and U-shaped one for inflation. Hence, the crises 
affects both investment and inflation favorably, that is increasing investment and lowering 
inflation, but this favorable effect only appears gradually and with a delay (and eventually 
dissipates again). Table 5, in turn, shows that the severity of the crisis depresses inflows of 
foreign direct investment (interestingly, military conflicts are less of a deterrent). Again, it is 
noteworthy that the reform index fosters FDI inflows. The crisis effect dominates that of per-
capita GDP: when entered on its own, the latter is marginally significant, indicating that richer 
countries are more attractive as destinations for FDI. However, GDP is never even close to 
being significant when entered alongside output fall.  
So far, we focused on the effect of crises on progress in economic reform and on 
economic performance. However, crises may also affect political institutions. Therefore, in 
Table 6, we consider the impact of the transition-induced recession on the pace of 
democratization. We measure the level of democracy as the average of the indicators of 
political freedoms and civil liberties reported by the Freedom House. Our measure of 
democratization, correspondingly, is the first difference of this indicator. Since we found 
earlier that crises translate into faster economic reform and that democratization also 
correlates with economic reform, we expected to find a positive effect again. Surprisingly, we 
                                                 
6 We also introduced a quadratic term for ouptput fall itself in the 5th model. We found a U shape curve between 
output fall and gdp per capita growth rate. Yet, the minimum of the function stands at 13.095, which is below the 
lowest observed output fall in our sample (Belarus in 1992 with an output fall egals to 13.35). Therefore, output 
fall has always a positive effect on gdp per capita growth rate in our model.   
  6 
found the reverse: the deeper the crises, the slower the subsequent democratization process. 
This effect is very robust to the inclusion of other variables, including GDP per capita – which 
appears to have positive effect on democratization (although it is not always significantly 
positive), richer countries tend to become more democratic. As the negative effect of output 
fall on democratization can vary over time, we again allow the effect to vary over time. None 
of the time and interaction terms are significant while the effect of the crisis itself remains 
unaffected (results not reported but available upon request). The last test we undertake is to 
introduce quadratic term of the output fall, to allow for nonlinearity in the effect, in column 
(6). We obtain a U-shaped effect, with the minimum attained for output fall reaching 39.5 
percent. Hence, if the crisis is deep enough, it does foster democratization.   
Given that we find that crises affect economic liberalization as well as democratization, 
although possibly in opposite directions (fostering liberalization but discouraging 
democratization), we explore the institutional effect further. Therefore, we ran regressions 
also with the institutional variables constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009). 
The results, however, appear mixed and not very consistent, at least at the first sight (Table 7). 
The depth of the transition-induced recession appears to translate into worse institutions 
(greater corruption and worse rule of law, voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality), although this negative effect is mostly 
insignificant. However, a very interesting pattern obtains when we account for the time-
varying effect of the crisis: the profile of that effect over time is U-shaped, with the quadratic 
term always significant. This implies that although the crisis may initially lead to a worsening 
of institutions, this is followed by an improvement later on: when it comes to crises, good 
things come to those who wait.  
The crises tend to be associated not only with output contractions but also with high 
inflation. We therefore construct another variable capturing cumulative inflation. This is an 
index of the overall cumulative price increase since 1989 (i.e. value of 2 corresponds to a 
doubling of the price level, 10 implies a ten-fold increase in prices, etc.). Once inflation has 
been stabilized, the index stays at the level attained at the time of stabilization. We define 
stabilization as inflation of 80% pa or lower. Most countries in our data set appear to succeed 
in controlling inflation after it has been brought down to two-digit levels, therefore this 
threshold tends to be indicative of a successful stabilization. The cumulative inflation variable 
thus captures the legacy of high inflation in the past even after run-away inflation has been 
stopped. All regressions, reported in Table 7, again control for the level of the reform index 
(which is not consistently significant) and for being involved in a military conflict (not 
surprisingly, wars are associated with much higher inflation). Neither output fall nor GDP per 
capita now appear significant as determinants of inflation. However, having a legacy of high 
past inflation exerts a negative effect: countries tend to learn a lesson from high-inflation 
episodes.  
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of crises on economic reforms, economic growth, 
inflation, investment and institutional change. We utilize the experience of the post-
communist countries which experienced periods of (often severe) crises following the 
collapse of communism and central planning in the early 1990s. Our results show that crises 
indeed serve as a catalyst for reforms. Specifically, crises foster economic reform and lead to 
better institutions (though the institutional improvement only occurs with a delay). Crises also 
improve economic performance: they are followed by higher growth and lower inflation. Our 
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results thus offer support for the „crises beget reform‟ hypothesis put forward by Alesina and 
Drazen (1991) and others. 
A plausible implication of our results is that seeking to avoid crises at all costs, as was the 
case with the Eurozone bailouts of Greece and Ireland in 2010, need not necessarily be 
productive. While it delivers short term benefits, it may come at a cost of postponing or even 
avoiding reform and result in lower long-term growth.  
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Table 1 Output Fall and Progress in Market-oriented reform  
Dependent variable:  EBRD index (first difference) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Lagged EBRD index -0.278 -0.185 -0.302 -0.277 -0.304 -0.35 
 (0.014)** (0.012)** (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.022)** (0.025)** 
Lagged Democracy 
index 0.079 0.059 0.077 0.065 0.055 0.058 
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
War -0.085 -0.108 -0.064 -0.104 -0.109 -0.091 
 (0.027)** (0.032)** (0.030)* (0.031)** (0.034)** (0.035)** 
Lagged outputfall 0.006  0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Lagged gdp p.c. 
(thousands)  -0.013 0.005 0.008 0.006 -0.014 
  (0.004)** (0.004) (0.004)* (0.004) (0.006)* 
Lagged inflation    0.013 0.005 0.011 
    (0.004)** (0.005) (0.005)* 
Lagged 
unemployment     -0.004 -0.004 
     (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Outputfall*time      0.0001 
       (0.0002) 
Outputfall*time²      -3.54E-06 
       (0.00002) 
Time after crisis      0.0106 
       (0.011) 
Time after crisis²      0.0003 
       (0.0007) 
Constant 0.265 0.421 0.241 0.23 0.384 0.563 
 (0.031)** (0.038)** (0.040)** (0.049)** (0.059)** (0.035)** 
Observations 550 524 524 495 456 456 
Number of 
Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.45 0.39 0.48 0.5 0.55 0.57 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 2 Output Fall and Economic Growth 
Dependent variable: GDP p.c. growth rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged EBRD index 4.031 7.612 4.158 2.273 3.162 2.733 
  (0.725)** (0.520)** (0.854)** (0.731)** (0.818)** (0.947)** 
Lagged Investment 0.009 -0.063 0.018 -0.017 -0.075 -0.112 
  -0.058 -0.057 -0.058 -0.044 -0.053 (0.056)* 
War -12.359 -14.932 -12.957 -9.455 -9.854 -8.448 
  (1.717)** (1.752)** (1.753)** (1.334)** (1.354)** (1.372)** 
Lagged outputfall 0.246  0.248 0.327 0.323 0.252 
  (0.043)**  (0.049)** (0.040)** (0.041)** (0.044)** 
Time*outputfall      0.028 
       (0.005)** 
Time²*outputfall      -0.0015 
        (0.0006)* 
Time after crisis      -0.273 
       (0.424) 
Time after crisis²      0.0225 
       (0.027) 
Lagged gdp p.c. 
(thousands)  -0.613 -0.134 -0.259 -0.192 -0.428 
   (0.182)** (0.201) (0.149) (0.156) (0.235) 
Lagged inflation    -1.404 -1.109 -0.696 
     (0.162)** (0.178)** (0.197)** 
Lagged 
unemployment     0.089 0.055 
      (0.072) (0.071) 
Constant -16.473 -10.567 -16.062 -8.709 -12.172 -9.6 
  (1.819)** (1.849)** (2.109)** (1.932)** (2.251)** (2.805)** 
Observations 505 503 503 479 451 451 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.67 0.69 0.7 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 3 Output Fall and Investment 
Dependent variable Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged Investment 0.702 0.7 0.701 0.718 0.665 0.613 
  (0.032)** (0.031)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.038)** (0.040)** 
Lagged  EBRDindex 1.485 1.695 1.621 1.808 2.299 2.971 
  (0.394)** (0.280)** (0.476)** (0.541)** (0.592)** (0.687)** 
War -1.116 -1.219 -1.177 -1.711 -1.482 -0.485 
  -0.945 -0.943 -0.969 -0.972 -0.961 -0.98 
Lagged outputfall 0.01  0.005 -0.01 -0.015 -0.053 
  -0.024  -0.028 -0.02 -0.03 -0.032 
outputfall*time      0.0198 
       (0.007)** 
outputfall*time²      -0.0009 
       (0.0005)* 
Time after crisis      -0.95 
       (0.305)** 
Time after crisis²      0.052 
       (0.019)** 
Lagged gdp p.c. 
(thousands)  -0.024 -0.013 -0.02 -0.046 -0.171 
   -0.101 -0.115 -0.112 -0.115 -0.171 
Lagged inflation    0.059 0.039 0.093 
     -0.12 -0.127 -0.142 
Lagged 
unemployment     -0.11 -0.11 
      (0.052)* (0.051)* 
Constant 2.584 2.609 2.49 2.122 3.504 5.033 
  (0.998)** (1.000)** (1.179)* -1.416 (1.601)* (2.010)* 
Observations 503 500 500 476 448 448 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.6 0.61 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 4 Output Fall and Inflation  
Dependent variable: Inflation  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged  EBRD index 4.104 51.012 139.601 -450.8 -479.3 
  -461.71 -393.82 -586.14 (106.67)** (136.6)** 
War 4,552.84 5,083.95 5,040.40 576.576 196.05 
  (1,126.2)** (1,172.3)** (1,192.7)** (213.6)** -220.86 
Lagged outputfall 4.308  -6.22 7.45 15.52 
  (24.06)  (30.46) (6.069) (6.15)* 
Outputfall*time     -6.9 
      (1.493)** 
Outputfall*time²     0.376 
      (0.103)** 
Time after crisis     210.47 
      (68.24)** 
Time after crisis²     -10.83 
      (4.35)* 
Lagged Gdp p.c. 
(thousands)  -8.138 -23.865 34.627 30.26 
   (128.2) (149.66) (24.71) (38.07) 
Lagged 
unemployment    -9.278 -3.9 
     (10.517) (10.54) 
Constant -21.855 73.299 189.697 918.949 813.9 
  (944.906) (1,181.98) (1,313.27) (229.015)** (220.86)* 
Observations 524 512 512 469 469 
Number of 
Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.17 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 5 Output Fall and Foreign Direct Investment Inflow 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged FDI 0.275 0.263 0.276 0.274 0.269 0.265 
  (0.046)** (0.048)** (0.046)** (0.047)** (0.048)** (0.048)** 
Lagged EBRD index 5.658 -1.402 6.069 2.482 2.011 0.561 
  (1.895)** (2.033) (2.381)* (2.912) (3.197) (3.762) 
War 2.281 13.164 2.323 1.824 -0.205 0.333 
  (5.203) (5.013)** (5.221) (5.614) (5.835) (6.058) 
Lagged outputfall -0.976  -0.992 -1.039 -0.996 -1.059 
  (0.168)**  (0.179)** (0.187)** (0.211)** (0.218)** 
Outputfall*time      0.0282 
       (0.035) 
Outputfall*time²      -0.0023 
       (0.0023) 
Time after crisis      -0.169 
       (1.588) 
Time after crisis²      0.063 
       (0.098) 
Lagged gdp p.c. 
(thousands)  0.813 -0.119 -0.208 -0.006 -0.684 
   (0.485) (0.498) (0.511) (0.544) (0.843) 
Lagged inflation    -1.422 -1.099 -0.605 
     (0.627)* (0.7) (0.843) 
Lagged 
unemployment     0.221 0.212 
      (0.246) (0.249) 
Constant 27.027 1.904 27.468 43.243 38.238 44.126 
  (6.208)** -4.963 (6.647)** (9.362)** (10.788)** (12.49)** 
Observations 448 447 447 433 414 414 
Number of 
Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.16 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 6 Output Fall and Democratization  
Dependent variable: Democracy (first difference) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged democracy -0.327 -0.354 -0.342 -0.396 -0.434 
 (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.027)** (0.030)** (0.030)** 
Lagged EBRD index -0.05 -0.018 -0.106 0.079 0.191 
 (0.046) (0.054) (0.06) (0.063) (0.065)** 
Lagged output fall -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.009 -0.044 
 (0.002)* (0.003)* (0.003) (0.003)** (0.007)** 
Lagged output fall 
squared     0.00048 
     (0.000)** 
War -0.556 -0.508 -0.363 -0.329 -0.158 
 (0.089)** (0.095)** (0.100)** (0.101)** -0.103 
Lagged gdp p.c. 
(thousands)  0.025 0.017 0.016 0.019 
  (0.012)* (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lagged inflation   -0.044 -0.008 0.014 
   (0.013)** (0.013) (0.014) 
Lagged 
unemployment    0.004 0.008 
    (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 1.821 1.747 1.963 1.85 2.037 
  (0.101)** (0.128)** (0.157)** (0.174)** (0.172)** 
Observations 551 525 496 457 457 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.37 0.4 0.37 0.33 0.38 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 7 Output Fall and Quality of institutions 
Dependent variable: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Voice and 
Account-
ability 
Political 
Stability 
Gov 
Effective-
ness 
Regulatory 
Quality Rule of Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged EBRD index 0.155 0.192 0.340 0.313 0.270 0.144 
 (0.085) (0.076)** (0.127)** (0.078)** (0.086)** (0.068)* 
Lagged democracy 0.103 0.214 0.027 0.039 0.014 0.068 
 (0.026)** (0.023)** (0.039) (0.024) (0.027) (0.021)** 
Lagged output fall -0.006 -0.015 0.012 -0.009 0.004 -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) 
Outputfall*time -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0006 
  (0.0006)* (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006)** (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Outputfall*time² 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0000)** (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 
Time after crisis 0.0348 0.026 -0.042 0.077 0.035 -0.018 
  (0.0282) (0.025) (0.042) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) 
Time after crisis² -0.0053 -0.0023 -0.0007 -0.0058 -0.0019 -0.0027 
 (0.0015)** (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0014)** (0.0015) (0.0012)* 
Lagged gdp p.c.  0.038 -0.018 0.033 0.032 -0.016 0.052 
  (thousands) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017)* (0.011)** (0.011) (0.009)** 
Lagged inflation -0.052 -0.010 0.032 -0.007 -0.013 -0.004 
  (log) (0.012) (.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
War -0.002 -0.183 -1.069 -0.148 -0.812 -0.198 
  (0.204) (0.182) (0.304)** (0.189) (0.206)** (0.164) 
Constant -1.076 -0.828 -1.758 -1.099 -1.124 -0.294 
 (0.628) (0.559) (0.935) (0.582) (0.633) (0.503) 
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.36 0.46 0.30 0.36 0.51 0.40 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 8 Cumulative Inflation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable: Inflation    
Lagged EBRD 
index 55.355 234.517 231.533 -493.653 
 (484.589) (422.007) (619.201) (112.527)** 
War 3,839.13 4,217.13 4,219.20 585.734 
 (1,211.194)** (1,239.001)** (1,279.563)** (222.243)** 
Lagged 
outputfall 11.216  0.221 8.54 
 (26.885)  (33.533) (6.424) 
Lagged gdp p.c. (thousands) -42.474 -41.971 38.195 
  (131.345) (152.015) (25.341) 
Cumulated 
inflation  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) 
Lagged unemployment   -10.802 
    (11.092) 
Constant -92.201 148.483 144.648 975.601 
 (1,019.0) (1,237.3) (1,368.5) (236.606)** 
Observations 493 482 482 448 
Number of 
Countries 27 27 27 27 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
 
